Open access
HOW DO PEOPLE WITH DEONTOLOGICAL AND UTILITARIAN INCLINATIONS DIFFER IN MORAL REASONING?
Anna Macko1
PHILOSOPHY – PERCEPTION AND VISUALIZATION OF WORLD AND LIFE
Publication language: Polish
Journal article
Transformations No. 1–2 (88–89) 2016, Publication date: 10 May 2016
Keywords: deontological inclinations, utilitarian inclinations, moral reasoning, sideeffect harm, probability of harm, magnitude of harm
Abstract This study compared the harshness of moral judgment and sensitivity to different aspects of a situation in judgments made by people with utilitarian and deontological inclinations. The participants were 240 students who made moral judgments in two business scenarios and then responded to moral dilemmas revealing their moral inclinations. The results showed that people with utilitarian inclinations were more sensitive in their judgments to the magnitude of side effect harm caused by the action, benefits gained through the action and, to a smaller extent, to the probability of a harmful side effect. People with deontological inclinations in turn were more sensitive to the information concerning the probability of a harmful side effect occurrence and to some extent also to the magnitude of this side effect. The results revealed that the moral reasoning of people with utilitarian inclinations and those with deontological inclinations (as measured by responses to moral dilemmas) did not match the classical understanding of utilitarian and deontological theories. People with deontological inclinations still revealed some sensitivity to the magnitude of harmful side effects, while people with utilitarian inclinations were not always sensitive to the information about the probability of this. Moreover, the results showed that people with utilitarian inclinations were more lenient in their condemnation judgments than people with deontological inclinations.
Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego, Katedra Psychologii Ekonomicznej
E-mail: amacko@kozminski.edu.pl